

<b>REPORT REFERENCE NO.</b>	<b>RC/19/6</b>
<b>MEETING</b>	<b>RESOURCES COMMITTEE (Budget)</b>
<b>DATE OF MEETING</b>	<b>7 FEBRUARY 2019</b>
<b>SUBJECT OF REPORT</b>	<b>TREASURY MANAGEMENT STRATEGY (INCLUDING PRUDENTIAL AND TREASURY INDICATORS REPORT 2019-20 TO 2021-22)</b>
<b>LEAD OFFICER</b>	<b>Director of Finance</b>
<b>RECOMMENDATIONS</b>	<p><b><i>(a). That the Authority be recommended to approve the following:</i></b></p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li><b><i>i. the Treasury Management Strategy and the Annual Investment Strategy;</i></b></li> <li><b><i>ii. the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) statement for 2019-20, as contained as Appendix B;</i></b></li> <li><b><i>iii. the amendment to Country Credit limits, outlined in paragraph 4.12, to allow for continued investments in the event that the UK sovereign rating is downgraded</i></b></li> </ul>
<b>EXECUTIVE SUMMARY</b>	<p>As agreed at the Fire Authority meeting of 18 December 2017, there is a new requirement for Resources Committee to review the Treasury Management Strategy for recommendation to the Full Authority. This report sets out a treasury management strategy and investment strategy for 2019-20, including the Prudential Indicators associated with the capital programme for 2019-20 to 2021-22 considered elsewhere on the agenda of this meeting. A Minimum Revenue Provision Statement for 2019-20 is also included for approval.</p>
<b>RESOURCE IMPLICATIONS</b>	As indicated in this report
<b>EQUALITY RISKS AND BENEFITS ANALYSIS (ERBA)</b>	The contents of this report are considered compatible with existing human rights and equality legislation.
<b>APPENDICES</b>	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>A. Prudential and Treasury Management Indicators 2019-20 to 2021-22.</li> <li>B. Minimum Revenue Provision Statement 2019-20.</li> </ul>
<b>LIST OF BACKGROUND PAPERS</b>	<p>Local Government Act 2003.</p> <p>Chartered Institute of Public Finance Accountancy's (CIPFA) Prudential Code and CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice</p>

## 1. **INTRODUCTION**

### ***Background***

- 1.1. The Authority is required to operate a balanced budget, which broadly means that cash raised during the year will meet cash expenditure. Part of the treasury management operation is to ensure that this cash flow is adequately planned, with cash being available when it is needed. Surplus monies are invested in low risk counterparties or instruments commensurate with the Authority's low risk appetite, providing adequate liquidity initially before considering investment return.
- 1.2. The second main function of the treasury management service is the funding of the Authority's capital plans. These capital plans provide a guide to the borrowing need of the Authority, essentially the longer term cash flow planning, to ensure that the Authority can meet its capital spending obligations. This management of longer term cash may involve arranging long or short term loans, or using longer term cash flow surpluses. On occasion any debt previously drawn may be restructured to meet Authority risk or cost objectives.
- 1.3. The contribution the treasury management function makes to the authority is critical, as the balance of debt and investment operations ensure liquidity or the ability to meet spending commitments as they fall due, either on day-to-day revenue or for larger capital projects. The treasury operations will see a balance of the interest costs of debt and the investment income arising from cash deposits affecting the available budget. Since cash balances generally result from reserves and balances, it is paramount to ensure adequate security of the sums invested, as a loss of principal will in effect result in a loss to the General Fund Balance.
- 1.4. Treasury management is defined as:

*“The management of the local authority's borrowing, investments and cash flows, its banking, money market and capital market transactions; the effective control of the risks associated with those activities; and the pursuit of optimum performance consistent with those risks.”*
- 1.5. Revised reporting is required for the 2019/20 reporting cycle due to revisions of the Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government (MHCLG) Investment Guidance, the MHCLG Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Guidance, the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code. The primary reporting changes include the introduction of a capital strategy, to provide a longer-term focus to the capital plans, and greater reporting requirements surrounding any commercial activity undertaken under the Localism Act 2011. The capital strategy is being reported separately.
- 1.6. This authority has not engaged in any commercial investments and has no non-treasury investments.

### ***Statutory requirements***

- 1.7. The Local Government Act 2003 (the Act) and supporting regulations requires the Authority to “have regard to” the CIPFA Prudential Code and the CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice to set Prudential and Treasury Indicators for the next three years to ensure that the Authority's capital investment plans are affordable, prudent and sustainable.

- 1.8. The Act therefore requires the Authority to set out its treasury strategy for borrowing and to prepare an Annual Investment Strategy (as required by Investment Guidance subsequent to the Act and included as paragraph 8 of this report); this sets out the Authority's policies for managing its investments and for giving priority to the security and liquidity of those investments.
- 1.9. MHCLG issued revised investment guidance which came into force from 1 April 2018. This guidance was captured within the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code 2017.

***CIPFA requirements***

- 1.10. The Authority has adopted the Chartered Institute of Public Finance and Accountancy's (CIPFA) Code of Practice on Treasury Management. The primary requirements of the Code are as follows:
- Creation and maintenance of a Treasury Management Policy Statement which sets out the policies and objectives of the Authority's treasury management activities.
  - Creation and maintenance of Treasury Management Practices which set out the manner in which the Authority will seek to achieve those policies and objectives.
  - Receipt by the Authority of an annual Treasury Management Strategy Statement – including the Annual Investment Strategy and Minimum Revenue Provision Policy for the year ahead, a mid-year review report and an annual report (stewardship report) covering activities during the previous year.
  - Delegation by the Authority of responsibilities for implementing and monitoring treasury management policies and practices and for this this Authority the delegated body is Resources Committee, and for the execution and administration of treasury management decisions and for this Authority the responsible officer is the Treasurer.
  - Delegation by the Authority of the role of scrutiny of treasury management strategy and polices to a named body. For this Authority the delegated body is Resources Committee.

***Treasury Management Strategy for 2019-20***

- 1.11. The suggested strategy for 2019-20 in respect of the following aspects of the treasury management function is based upon the treasury officers' views on interest rates, supplemented with leading market forecasts provided by the Authority's treasury advisor, Link Asset Services (Link).
- 1.12. The strategy for 2019-20 covers two main areas:

**Capital Issues**

- capital plans and prudential indicators
- the Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) strategy

**Treasury Management Issues**

- treasury limits in force which will limit the treasury risk and activities of the Authority
- treasury Indicators
- the current treasury position

- the borrowing requirement
- prospects for interest rates
- the borrowing strategy
- policy on borrowing in advance of need
- debt rescheduling
- the investment strategy
- creditworthiness policy
- policy on use of external service providers

### ***Training***

1.13. The CIPFA Code requires the responsible officer to ensure that members with responsibility for treasury management receive adequate training in treasury management. This especially applies to members responsible for scrutiny. A proportionate training plan will be developed for members of the Resources Committee.

1.14. The training needs of treasury management officers are periodically reviewed.

### ***Treasury Management Advisors***

1.15. The Authority uses Link Asset Services, Treasury solutions as its external treasury management advisors.

1.16. The Authority recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon the services of our external service providers. All decisions will be undertaken with regards to all available information, including, but not solely, our treasury advisers.

1.17. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Authority will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

## **2. CAPITAL PRUDENTIAL INDICATORS FOR 2019-20 TO 2021-22**

2.1. The Authority's capital expenditure plans are the key driver of treasury management activity. The output of the capital expenditure plans is reflected in the prudential indicators, which are designed to assist members' overview and confirm capital expenditure plans.

2.2. This prudential indicator is a summary of the Authority's capital expenditure plans, both those agreed previously, and those forming part of this budget cycle. Members are asked to approve the capital expenditure forecasts as proposed in the Capital Programme report considered elsewhere on the agenda. Other long term liabilities such as PFI and leasing arrangements which already include borrowing instruments are excluded.

Proposed Capital Expenditure	2018-19 (forecast spending)	2019-20	2020-21 (provisional)	2021-22 (provisional)
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Estates	1.802	4.407	10.200	7.900
Fleet & Equipment	2.140	3.607	6.300	4.900
Total	3.942	8.014	16.500	12.800

- 2.3. The following table summarises the financing of the capital programmes shown above. Additional capital finance sources may become available during the year, for example, additional grants or external contributions. The Authority will be requested to approve increases to the capital programme to be financed from other capital resources as and when the need arises.

***The Revenue Funding outlined below is conditional upon the Fire Authority decision over levels of Council Tax for 2019-20 – figures below are based on a Council Tax increase of 2.99%.***

Capital Financing	2018-19 (forecast spending)	2019-20	2020-21 (provisional)	2021-22 (provisional)
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Capital receipts/ contributions	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.250
Capital grants	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Capital reserves	0.000	3.734	11.484	1.782
Revenue	2.031	2.319	2.319	2.319
Existing and New borrowing	1.911	1.961	1.447	8.449
Total	3.942	8.014	16.500	12.800

***The Authority's Borrowing Need (Capital Financing Requirement)***

- 2.4. The second prudential indicator is the Authority's Capital Financing Requirement (CFR). The CFR is simply the total historic outstanding capital expenditure which has not yet been paid for from either revenue or capital resources. It is essentially a measure of the Authority's indebtedness and so its underlying borrowing need. Any capital expenditure above, which has not immediately been paid for, will increase the CFR.
- 2.5. The CFR does not increase indefinitely, as the minimum revenue provision (MRP) is a statutory annual revenue charge which broadly reduces the indebtedness in line with each assets life, and so charges the economic consumption of capital assets as they are used.
- 2.6. The CFR includes any other long-term liabilities (e.g. PFI schemes, finance leases). Whilst these increase the CFR, and therefore the Authority's borrowing requirement, these types of scheme include a borrowing facility by the PFI, PPP lease provider and so the Authority is not required to separately borrow for these schemes. The Authority currently has £1.209m of such schemes within the CFR.
- 2.7. The Authority is asked to approve the CFR projections below as included in Appendix A:

Capital Financing Requirement (CFR)	2018-19 (forecast spending)	2019-20	2020-21 (provisional)	2021-22 (provisional)
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Non-HRA expenditure	25.538	25.444	24.851	31.269
Other Long Term Liabilities	1.209	1.112	1.010	0.907
Total CFR	26.747	26.556	25.861	32.176
Movement in CFR	(2.276)	(2.343)	(2.836)	4.180
Less MRP	(2.093)	(2.152)	(2.141)	(2.135)
Net movement in CFR	(0.182)	(0.191)	(0.694)	6.314

### Core funds and expected investment balances

- 2.8. The application of resources (capital receipts, reserves etc.) to either finance capital expenditure or other budget decisions to support the revenue budget will have an ongoing impact on investments unless resources are supplemented each year from new sources (asset sales etc.). Detailed below are estimates of the year-end balances for each resource and anticipated day-to-day cash flow balances.

Estimated Year end Resources	2018-19	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Reserve Balances	32.529	26.795	13.311	9.529
Capital receipts/ contributions	0.000	0.000	1.250	0.250
Provisions	1.304	0.304	0.000	0.000
Other	8.899	10.860	12.307	20.757
Total core funds	42.732	37.959	26.868	30.535
Working capital*	1.000	1.000	1.000	1.000
Under/over borrowing	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000
Expected investments	43.732	38.959	27.868	31.535

\*Working capital balances shown are estimated year-end; these may be higher mid-year

### Minimum Revenue Provision (MRP) Strategy

- 2.9. The Authority is required to pay off an element of the accumulated General Fund capital spend each year (the CFR) through a revenue charge (the minimum revenue provision - MRP), although it is also allowed to undertake additional voluntary payments if required (voluntary revenue provision - VRP).
- 2.10. MHCLG regulations have been issued which require the full Authority to approve an **MRP Statement** in advance of each year. A variety of options are provided under which MRP could be made, with an overriding recommendation that the Authority should make prudent provision to redeem its debt liability over a period which is reasonably commensurate with that over which the capital expenditure is estimated to provide benefits.
- 2.11. Although four main options are provided under the guidance, the Authority has adopted:

### ***The Asset Life Method***

- 2.12. Where capital expenditure on an asset is financed wholly or partly by borrowing or credit arrangements, MRP is to be made in equal annual instalments over the life of the asset. In this circumstance the asset life is to be determined when MRP commences and not changed after that.
- 2.13. MRP should normally commence in the financial year following the one in which the expenditure is incurred. However, when borrowing to construct an asset, the authority may treat the asset life as commencing in the year in which the asset first becomes operational. It may accordingly postpone beginning to make MRP until that year. Investment properties should be regarded as becoming operational when they begin to generate revenues.
- 2.14. As some types of capital expenditure incurred by the Authority are not capable of being related to an individual asset, asset lives will be assessed on a basis which most reasonably reflects the anticipated period of benefit that arises from the expenditure. Also, whatever type of expenditure is involved, it will be grouped together in a manner which reflects the nature of the main component of expenditure and will only be divided up in cases where there are two or more major components with substantially different useful economic lives.
- 2.15. A draft MRP statement for 2019-20 is attached as Appendix B for Authority approval.
- 2.16. The financing of the approved 2019-20 capital programme, and the resultant prudential indicators have been set on the basis of the content of this statement.

### ***Prudential Indicators for Affordability***

- 2.17. The previous sections of the report cover the overall limits for capital expenditure and borrowing, but within the overall framework indicators are also included to demonstrate the affordability of capital investment plans.
- 2.18. A key indicator of the affordability of capital investment plans is the ratio of financing costs to the net revenue stream; this indicator identifies the trend in the cost of capital financing (borrowing costs net of investment income) against the Authority's net budget requirement. Annual capital financing costs are a product of total debt outstanding, the annual repayment regime and interest rates. The forecast ratios for 2019-20 to 2021-22 based on current commitments and the proposed Capital Programme are shown below.

<b>Financing costs as a % of net revenue</b>	<b>2018-19 (forecast spending)</b>	<b>2019-20</b>	<b>2020-21 (provisional)</b>	<b>2021-22 (provisional)</b>
Annual cost	3.93%	4.03%	3.97%	4.11%

## **3. BORROWING**

- 3.1. The capital expenditure plans set out in Section 2 provide details of the service activity of the Authority. The treasury management function ensures that the Authority's cash is organised in accordance with the relevant professional codes, so that sufficient cash is available to meet this service activity and the Authority's capital strategy. This will involve both the organisation of the cash flow and, where capital plans require, the organisation of appropriate borrowing facilities. The strategy covers the relevant treasury / prudential indicators, the current and projected debt positions and the annual investment strategy.

### Current borrowing position

3.2. The Authority's treasury portfolio position at 31 March 2018 and current are summarised below.

3.3.

<b>TREASURY PORTFOLIO</b>				
	actual	actual	current	current
	<b>31.3.18</b>	<b>31.3.18</b>	<b>31.12.18</b>	<b>31.12.18</b>
	£000	%	£000	%
<b>Treasury investments</b>				
banks	26,401	71%	31,001	80%
building societies - unrated	0	0%	0	0%
building societies - rated	2,000	5%	3,100	8%
local authorities	5,000	13%	3,500	9%
DMADF (H.M.Treasury)	0	0%	0	0%
money market funds	3,906	10%	1,075	3%
certificates of deposit	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Total managed in house</b>	<b>37,307</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>38,676</b>	<b>100%</b>
bond funds	0	0%	0	0%
property funds	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Total managed externally</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>0%</b>
<b>Total treasury investments</b>	<b>37,307</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>38,676</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Treasury external borrowing</b>				
local authorities	0	0%	0	0%
PWLB	25,631	100%	25,584	100%
LOBOs	0	0%	0	0%
<b>Total external borrowing</b>	<b>25,631</b>	<b>100%</b>	<b>25,584</b>	<b>100%</b>
<b>Net treasury investments / (borrowing)</b>	<b>11,676</b>	<b>0</b>	<b>13,092</b>	<b>0</b>

The Authority's forward projections for borrowing are summarised below. The table shows the actual external debt (the treasury management operations), against the underlying capital borrowing need (the Capital Financing Requirement - CFR), highlighting any over or under borrowing.

External Debt	2018-19 (forecast spending)	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Debt at 1 April	25.631	25.537	25.444	24.851
Expected change in Debt	(0.093)	(0.093)	(0.593)	6.418
Other long-term liabilities (OLTL)	1.299	1.209	1.112	1.010
Expected change in OLTL	(0.090)	(0.098)	(0.101)	(0.103)
Actual gross debt at 31 March	26.747	26.556	25.861	32.176
CFR	26.747	26.556	25.861	32.176
Under/ Over borrowing	0.000	0.000	0.000	0.000

- 3.4. Within the prudential indicators there are a number of key indicators to ensure that the Authority operates its activities within well-defined limits. One of these is that the Authority needs to ensure that its gross debt does not, except in the short term, exceed the total of the CFR in the preceding year plus the estimates of any additional CFR for 2019-20 and the following two financial years. This allows some flexibility for limited early borrowing for future years, but ensures that borrowing is not undertaken for revenue or speculative purposes.
- 3.5. The Director of Finance reports that the Authority complied with this prudential indicator in the current year and does not envisage difficulties for the future. This view takes into account current commitments, existing plans, and the proposals in this budget report.

**Limits to Borrowing Activity**

- 3.6. Two Treasury Management Indicators control the level of borrowing. They are:

- **The operational boundary.** This is the limit beyond which external debt is not normally expected to exceed. In most cases, this would be a similar figure to the CFR, but may be lower or higher depending on the levels of actual debt and the ability to fund under-borrowing by other cash resources.

<b>Estimated Operational Boundary</b>	<b>2018-19</b>	<b>2019-20</b>	<b>2020-21</b>	<b>2021-22</b>
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Non-HRA expenditure	25,731	25,637	25,544	31,462
Other Long Term Liabilities	1,299	1,209	1,112	1,010
<b>Total</b>	<b>27,029</b>	<b>26,847</b>	<b>26,656</b>	<b>32,472</b>

- **The authorised limit for external debt.** A further key prudential indicator represents a control on the maximum level of borrowing. This represents a limit beyond which external debt is prohibited, and this limit needs to be set or revised by the full Authority. It reflects the level of external debt which, while not desired, could be afforded in the short term, but is not sustainable in the longer term.

This is the statutory limit determined under section 3 (1) of the Local Government Act 2003. The Government retains an option to control either the total of all Authority's plans, or those of a specific Authority, although this power has not yet been exercised.

The Authority is asked to approve the following authorised limit:

<b>Estimated Authorised Limit</b>	<b>2018-19</b>	<b>2019-20</b>	<b>2020-21</b>	<b>2021-22</b>
	£m	£m	£m	£m
Non-HRA expenditure	27,007	26,910	26,787	33,025
Other Long Term Liabilities	1,359	1,265	1,162	1,056
<b>Total</b>	<b>28,367</b>	<b>28,174</b>	<b>27,949</b>	<b>34,081</b>

### Prospects for interest rates

- 3.7. The Authority has appointed Link Asset Services as its treasury advisor and part of their service is to assist the Authority to formulate a view on interest rates. The following table and narrative in paragraphs 3.8 and 3.9 gives their central view.

Link Asset Services Interest Rate View												
	Jun-19	Sep-19	Dec-19	Mar-20	Jun-20	Sep-20	Dec-20	Mar-21	Jun-21	Sep-21	Dec-21	Mar-22
Bank Rate View	0.75%	1.00%	1.00%	1.00%	1.25%	1.25%	1.25%	1.50%	1.50%	1.75%	1.75%	1.75%
3 Month LIBID	0.90%	1.00%	1.10%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%
6 Month LIBID	1.00%	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%
12 Month LIBID	1.20%	1.30%	1.40%	1.50%	1.60%	1.70%	1.80%	1.90%	2.00%	2.10%	2.20%	2.30%
5yr PWLB Rate	2.10%	2.20%	2.20%	2.30%	2.30%	2.40%	2.50%	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%
10yr PWLB Rate	2.50%	2.60%	2.60%	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%
25yr PWLB Rate	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%	3.40%	3.50%	3.50%	3.60%
50yr PWLB Rate	2.70%	2.80%	2.90%	2.90%	3.00%	3.10%	3.10%	3.20%	3.20%	3.30%	3.30%	3.40%

### 3.8. ECONOMIC BACKGROUND

**GLOBAL OUTLOOK.** World growth has been doing reasonably well, aided by strong growth in the US. However, US growth is likely to fall back in 2019 and, together with weakening economic activity in China and the eurozone, overall world growth is likely to weaken.

**Inflation** has been weak during 2018 but, at long last, unemployment falling to remarkably low levels in the US and UK has led to an acceleration of wage inflation. The US Fed has therefore increased rates nine times and the Bank of England twice. However, the ECB is unlikely to start raising rates until late in 2019 at the earliest.

#### **KEY RISKS - central bank monetary policy measures**

Looking back on nearly ten years since the financial crash of 2008 when liquidity suddenly dried up in financial markets, it can be assessed that central banks' monetary policy measures to counter the sharp world recession were successful. The key monetary policy measures they used were a combination of lowering central interest rates and flooding financial markets with liquidity, particularly through unconventional means such as quantitative easing (QE), where central banks bought large amounts of central government debt and smaller sums of other debt.

**The key issue now** is that period of stimulating economic recovery and warding off the threat of deflation, is coming towards its close. A new period is well advanced in the US, and started more recently in the UK, of reversing those measures i.e. by raising central rates and, (for the US), reducing central banks' holdings of government and other debt. These measures are now required in order to stop the trend of a reduction in spare capacity in the economy and of unemployment falling to such low levels, that the re-emergence of inflation is viewed as a major risk. It is, therefore, crucial that central banks get their timing right and do not cause shocks to market expectations that could destabilise financial markets. In particular, a key risk is that because QE-driven purchases of bonds drove up the price of government debt, and therefore caused a sharp drop in income yields, this also encouraged investors into a search for yield and into investing in riskier assets such as equities. Consequently, prices in both bond and equity markets rose to historically high valuation levels simultaneously. This meant that both asset categories were exposed to the risk of a sharp downward correction and we did, indeed, see a sharp fall in equity values in the last quarter of 2018. It is important, therefore, that central banks only gradually unwind their holdings of bonds in order to prevent destabilising the financial markets. It is also likely that the timeframe for central banks unwinding their holdings of QE debt purchases will be over several years.

They need to balance their timing to neither squash economic recovery, by taking too rapid and too strong action, or, conversely, let inflation run away by taking action that was too slow and/or too weak. **The potential for central banks to get this timing and strength of action wrong are now key risks.** At the time of writing, (early January 2019), financial markets are very concerned that the Fed is being too aggressive with its policy for raising interest rates and is likely to cause a recession in the US economy.

The world economy also needs to adjust to a sharp change in **liquidity creation** over the last five years where the US has moved from boosting liquidity by QE purchases, to reducing its holdings of debt (currently about \$50bn per month). In addition, the European Central Bank ended its QE purchases in December 2018.

**UK.** The flow of positive economic statistics since the end of the first quarter of 2018 has shown that pessimism was overdone about the poor growth in quarter 1 when adverse weather caused a temporary downward blip. Quarter 1 at 0.1% growth in GDP was followed by a return to 0.4% in quarter 2 and by a strong performance in quarter 3 of +0.6%. However, growth in quarter 4 is expected to weaken significantly.

At their November quarterly Inflation Report meeting, the MPC repeated their well-worn phrase that future Bank Rate increases would be gradual and would rise to a much lower equilibrium rate, (where monetary policy is neither expansionary or contractionary), than before the crash; indeed they gave a figure for this of around 2.5% in ten years' time, but declined to give a medium term forecast. However, with so much uncertainty around Brexit, they warned that the next move could be up or down, even if there was a disorderly Brexit. While it would be expected that Bank Rate could be cut if there was a significant fall in GDP growth as a result of a disorderly Brexit, so as to provide a stimulus to growth, they warned they could also *raise* Bank Rate in the same scenario if there was a boost to inflation from a devaluation of sterling, increases in import prices and more expensive goods produced in the UK replacing cheaper goods previously imported, and so on. In addition, the Chancellor could potentially provide fiscal stimulus to support economic growth, though at the cost of increasing the budget deficit above currently projected levels.

It is unlikely that the MPC would increase Bank Rate in February 2019, ahead of the deadline in March for Brexit. Getting parliamentary approval for a Brexit agreement on both sides of the Channel will take well into spring 2019. However, in view of the hawkish stance of the MPC at their November meeting, the next increase in Bank Rate is now forecast to be in May 2019, (on the assumption that a Brexit deal is agreed by both the UK and the EU). The following increases are then forecast to be in February and November 2020 before ending up at 2.0% in February 2022.

**Inflation.** The Consumer Price Index (CPI) measure of inflation has been falling from a peak of 3.1% in November 2017 to 2.1% in December 2018. In the November Bank of England quarterly Inflation Report, inflation was forecast to still be marginally above its 2% inflation target two years ahead, (at about 2.1%), given a scenario of minimal increases in Bank Rate.

As for the **labour market** figures in October, unemployment at 4.1% was marginally above a 43 year low of 4% on the Independent Labour Organisation measure. A combination of job vacancies hitting an all-time high, together with negligible growth in total employment numbers, indicates that employers are now having major difficulties filling job vacancies with suitable staff. It was therefore unsurprising that wage inflation picked up to 3.3%, (3 month average regular pay, excluding bonuses). This meant that in real terms, (i.e. wage rates less CPI inflation), earnings are currently growing by about 1.2%, the highest level since 2009. This increase in household spending power is likely to feed through into providing some support to the overall rate of economic growth in the coming months.

This tends to confirm that the MPC was right to start on a cautious increase in Bank Rate in August as it views wage inflation in excess of 3% as increasing inflationary pressures within the UK economy.

In the **political arena**, the Brexit deal put forward by the Conservative minority government was defeated on 15 January. It is unclear at the time of writing, how this situation will move forward. (*Officers are likely to need to verbally update members as events are constantly evolving.*) However, our central position is that Prime Minister May's government will endure, despite various setbacks, along the route to reaching an orderly Brexit though the risks are increasing that it may not be possible to get full agreement by the UK and EU before 29 March 2019, in which case this withdrawal date is likely to be pushed back to a new date. If, however, the UK faces a general election in the next 12 months, this could result in a potential loosening of monetary and fiscal policy and therefore medium to longer dated gilt yields could rise on the expectation of a weak pound and concerns around inflation picking up.

**USA.** President Trump's massive easing of fiscal policy is fuelling a (temporary) boost in consumption which has generated an upturn in the rate of strong growth which rose from 2.2% (annualised rate) in quarter 1 to 4.2% in quarter 2 and 3.5%, (3.0% y/y), in quarter 3, but also an upturn in inflationary pressures. The strong growth in employment numbers and the reduction in the unemployment rate to 3.9%, near to a recent 49 year low, has fed through to an upturn in wage inflation which hit 3.2% in November. However, CPI inflation overall fell to 2.2% in November and looks to be on a falling trend to drop below the Fed's target of 2% during 2019. The Fed has continued on its series of increases in interest rates with another 0.25% increase in December to between 2.25% and 2.50%, this being the fifth increase in 2018 and the ninth in this cycle. However, they did also reduce their forecast for further increases from three to two. This latest increase compounded investor fears that the Fed is over doing the speed and level of increases in rates and that it is going to cause a US recession as a result. There is also much evidence in previous monetary policy cycles of the Fed's series of increases doing exactly that. Consequently, we have seen stock markets around the world falling under the weight of fears around the Fed's actions, the trade war between the US and China and an expectation that world growth will slow.

The tariff war between the US and China has been generating a lot of heat during 2018, but it is not expected that the current level of actual action would have much in the way of a significant effect on US or world growth. However, there is a risk of escalation if an agreement is not reached soon between the US and China.

**Eurozone.** Growth was 0.4% in quarters 1 and 2 but fell back to 0.2% in quarter 3, though this was probably just a temporary dip. In particular, data from Germany has been mixed and it could be negatively impacted by US tariffs on a significant part of its manufacturing exports e.g. cars. For that reason, although growth is still expected to be in the region of nearly 2% for 2018, the horizon is less clear than it seemed just a short while ago. Having halved its quantitative easing purchases of debt in October 2018 to €15bn per month, the European Central Bank ended all further purchases in December 2018. The ECB is forecasting inflation to be a little below its 2% top limit through the next three years so it may find it difficult to warrant a start on raising rates by the end of 2019 if the growth rate of the EU economy is on a weakening trend.

**China.** Economic growth has been weakening over successive years, despite repeated rounds of central bank stimulus; medium term risks are increasing. Major progress still needs to be made to eliminate excess industrial capacity and the stock of unsold property, and to address the level of non-performing loans in the banking and credit systems. Progress has been made in reducing the rate of credit creation, particularly from the shadow banking sector, which is feeding through into lower economic growth. There are concerns that official economic statistics are inflating the published rate of growth.

**Japan** - has been struggling to stimulate consistent significant GDP growth and to get inflation up to its target of 2%, despite huge monetary and fiscal stimulus. It is also making little progress on fundamental reform of the economy. It is likely that loose monetary policy will endure for some years yet to try to stimulate growth and modest inflation.

**Emerging countries.** Argentina and Turkey are currently experiencing major headwinds and are facing challenges in external financing requirements well in excess of their reserves of foreign exchange. However, these countries are small in terms of the overall world economy, (around 1% each), so the fallout from the expected recessions in these countries will be minimal.

### **INTEREST RATE FORECASTS**

The interest rate forecasts provided by Link Asset Services in paragraph 3.2 are **predicated on an assumption of an agreement being reached on Brexit between the UK and the EU.** On this basis, while GDP growth is likely to be subdued in 2019 due to all the uncertainties around Brexit depressing consumer and business confidence, an agreement is likely to lead to a boost to the rate of growth in 2020 which could, in turn, increase inflationary pressures in the economy and so cause the Bank of England to resume a series of gentle increases in Bank Rate. Just how fast, and how far, those increases will occur and rise to, will be data dependent. The forecasts in this report assume a modest recovery in the rate and timing of stronger growth and in the corresponding response by the Bank in raising rates.

- In the event of an **orderly non-agreement exit**, it is likely that the Bank of England would take action to cut Bank Rate from 0.75% in order to help economic growth deal with the adverse effects of this situation. This is also likely to cause short to medium term gilt yields to fall.
- If there was a **disorderly Brexit**, then any cut in Bank Rate would be likely to last for a longer period and also depress short and medium gilt yields correspondingly. It is also possible that the government could act to protect economic growth by implementing fiscal stimulus.

However, there would appear to be a majority consensus in the Commons against any form of non-agreement exit so the chance of this occurring has now substantially diminished.

### **The balance of risks to the UK**

- The overall balance of risks to economic growth in the UK is probably neutral.
- The balance of risks to increases in Bank Rate and shorter term PWLB rates, are probably also even and are broadly dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how slowly inflation pressures subside, and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

One risk that is both an upside and downside risk, is that all central banks are now working in very different economic conditions than before the 2008 financial crash as there has been a major increase in consumer and other debt due to the exceptionally low levels of borrowing rates that have prevailed for ten years since 2008. This means that the neutral rate of interest in an economy, (i.e. the rate that is neither expansionary nor deflationary), is difficult to determine definitively in this new environment, although central banks have made statements that they expect it to be much lower than before 2008. Central banks could therefore either over or under do increases in central interest rates.

**Downside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates currently include:**

- **Brexit** – if it were to cause significant economic disruption and a major downturn in the rate of growth.
- **Bank of England monetary policy** takes action too quickly, or too far, over the next three years to raise Bank Rate and causes UK economic growth, and increases in inflation, to be weaker than we currently anticipate.
- A resurgence of the **eurozone sovereign debt crisis**, possibly in **Italy**, due to its high level of government debt, low rate of economic growth and vulnerable banking system, and due to the election in March of a government which has made a lot of anti-austerity noise. The EU rejected the initial proposed Italian budget and demanded cuts in government spending which the Italian government initially refused. However, a fudge was subsequently agreed, but only by *delaying* the planned increases in expenditure to a later year. This can have therefore only been kicked down the road to a later time. The rating agencies have started on downgrading Italian debt to one notch above junk level. If Italian debt were to fall below investment grade, many investors would be unable to hold it. Unsurprisingly, investors are becoming increasingly concerned by the words and actions of the Italian government and consequently, Italian bond yields have risen – at a time when the government faces having to refinance large amounts of debt maturing in 2019.
- Weak capitalisation of some **European banks**. Italian banks are particularly vulnerable; one factor is that they hold a high level of Italian government debt - debt which is falling in value. This is therefore undermining their capital ratios and raises the question of whether they will need to raise fresh capital to plug the gap.
- **German minority government**. In the German general election of September 2017, Angela Merkel's CDU party was left in a vulnerable minority position dependent on the fractious support of the SPD party, as a result of the rise in popularity of the anti-immigration AfD party. Then in October 2018, the results of the Bavarian and Hesse state elections radically undermined the SPD party and showed a sharp fall in support for the CDU. As a result, the SPD is reviewing whether it can continue to support a coalition that is so damaging to its electoral popularity. After the result of the Hesse state election, Angela Merkel announced that she would not stand for re-election as CDU party leader at her party's convention in December 2018, (a new party leader has now been elected). However, this makes little practical difference as she is still expected to aim to continue for now as the Chancellor. However, there are five more state elections coming up in 2019 and EU parliamentary elections in May/June; these could result in a further loss of electoral support for both the CDU and SPD which could also undermine her leadership.

- **Other minority eurozone governments.** Spain, Portugal, Ireland, the Netherlands and Belgium all have vulnerable minority governments dependent on coalitions which could prove fragile. Sweden is also struggling to form a government due to the anti-immigration party holding the balance of power, and which no other party is willing to form a coalition with. The Belgian coalition collapsed in December 2018 but a minority caretaker government has been appointed until the May EU wide general elections.
- **Austria, the Czech Republic and Hungary** now form a strongly anti-immigration bloc within the EU while **Italy**, in 2018, also elected a strongly anti-immigration government. Elections to the EU parliament are due in May/June 2019.
- Further increases in interest rates in the US could spark a **sudden flight of investment funds** from more risky assets e.g. shares, into bonds yielding a much improved yield. Throughout the last quarter of 2018, we saw sharp falls in equity markets interspersed with occasional partial rallies. Emerging countries which have borrowed heavily in dollar denominated debt, could be particularly exposed to this risk of an investor flight to safe havens e.g. UK gilts.
- There are concerns around the level of **US corporate debt** which has swollen massively during the period of low borrowing rates in order to finance mergers and acquisitions. This has resulted in the debt of many large corporations being downgraded to a BBB credit rating, close to junk status. Indeed, 48% of total investment grade corporate debt is now rated at BBB. If such corporations fail to generate profits and cash flow to reduce their debt levels as expected, this could tip their debt into junk ratings which will increase their cost of financing and further negatively impact profits and cash flow.
- **Geopolitical risks**, especially North Korea, but also in Europe and the Middle East, which could lead to increasing safe haven flows.

#### **Upside risks to current forecasts for UK gilt yields and PWLB rates**

- **Brexit** – if both sides were to agree by 29 March a compromise that quickly removed all threats of economic and political disruption and so led to an early boost to UK economic growth.
- **The Fed causing a sudden shock in financial markets** through misjudging the pace and strength of increases in its Fed Funds Rate and in the pace and strength of reversal of QE, which then leads to a fundamental reassessment by investors of the relative risks of holding bonds, as opposed to equities. This could lead to a major flight from bonds to equities and a sharp increase in bond yields in the US, which could then spill over into impacting bond yields around the world.
- The **Bank of England is too slow** in its pace and strength of increases in Bank Rate and, therefore, allows inflation pressures to build up too strongly within the UK economy, which then necessitates a later rapid series of increases in Bank Rate faster than we currently expect.
- **UK inflation**, whether domestically generated or imported, returning to sustained significantly higher levels causing an increase in the inflation premium inherent to gilt yields.

### 3.9. BREXIT TIMETABLE AND PROCESS

March 2017	UK government notified the European Council of its intention to leave under the Treaty on European Union Article 50 on 29 March 2019.
25.11.18	EU27 leaders endorsed the withdrawal agreement
Dec 2018	vote in the UK Parliament on the agreement was postponed
21.12.18 – 8.1.19	UK parliamentary recess
15.1.19	Brexit deal defeated in the Commons vote by a large margin
By 29.3.19	second vote (?) in UK parliament
By 29.3.19	if the UK Parliament approves a deal, then ratification by the EU Parliament requires a simple majority
By 29.3.19	if the UK and EU parliaments agree the deal, the EU Council needs to approve the deal; 20 countries representing 65% of the EU population must agree
29.3.19	Either the UK leaves the EU, or asks the EU for agreement to an extension of the Article 50 period if the UK Parliament has been unable to agree on a Brexit deal.
29.3.19	if an agreement is reached with the EU on the terms of Brexit, then this will be followed by a proposed <b>transitional period ending around December 2020</b> .
	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>UK continues as a full EU member until March 2019 with access to the single market and tariff free trade between the EU and UK. Different sectors of the UK economy may leave the single market and tariff free trade at different times during the transitional period.</li> <li>The UK and EU would attempt to negotiate, among other agreements, a bi-lateral trade agreement over that period.</li> <li>The UK would aim for a negotiated agreed withdrawal from the EU, although the UK could also exit without any such agreements in the event of a breakdown of negotiations.</li> <li>If the UK exits without an agreed deal with the EU, World Trade Organisation rules and tariffs could apply to trade between the UK and EU - but this is not certain.</li> <li>On full exit from the EU: the UK parliament would repeal the 1972 European Communities Act.</li> </ul>

#### ***Borrowing strategy***

3.10. As reported in the separate report on this agenda “Capital Programme 2019-20 to 2021-22”, it is the strategic intent of the Authority not to increase its exposure to external borrowing during the next six years. To achieve this a recommendation the Authority has supported the inclusion in the base revenue budget a revenue contribution to capital investment (£2.3m in 2019-20).

3.11. This being the case there is no intention to take out any new borrowing during 2019-20. Should this position change then the Treasury Management Strategy will need to be reviewed to reflect any change to the borrowing strategy and would be subject to a further report to the full Authority.

#### ***Policy on borrowing in advance of need***

3.12. The Authority will not borrow more than or in advance of its needs purely in order to profit from the investment of the extra sums borrowed. Any decision to borrow in advance will be considered carefully to ensure value for money can be demonstrated and that the Authority can ensure the security of such funds.

### ***Debt rescheduling***

- 3.13. As short term borrowing rates will be considerably cheaper than longer term rates, there may be potential for some residual opportunities to generate savings by switching from long term debt to short term debt. However, these savings will need to be considered in the light of the size of premiums incurred, their short term nature and the likely cost of refinancing those short term loans, once they mature, compared to the current rates of longer term debt in the existing debt portfolio. Any such rescheduling and repayment of debt is likely to cause a flattening of the authority's maturity profile as in recent years there has been a skew towards longer dated PWLB.
- 3.14. Consideration will also be given to identify if there is any potential for making savings by running down investment balances to repay debt prematurely as short term rates on investments are likely to be lower than rates paid on current debt.
- 3.15. The reasons for any rescheduling to take place will include:
- the generation of cash savings and / or discounted cash flow savings,
  - helping to fulfil the adopted borrowing strategy, and
  - enhancing the balance of the portfolio (amend the maturity profile and/or the balance of volatility).
- 3.14. All rescheduling will be reported to the Resources Committee, at the earliest meeting following its action.

## **4. ANNUAL INVESTMENT STRATEGY**

### ***Investment Policy***

- 4.1. The Authority's investment policy has regard to the MHCLG's Guidance on Local Government Investments ("the Guidance"), CIPFA Treasury Management in Public Services Code of Practice and Cross Sectoral Guidance Notes 2017 ("the CIPFA TM Code") and the CIPFA Treasury Management Guidance Notes 2018. The Authority's investment priorities will be security first, portfolio liquidity second, then yield.
- 4.2. In accordance with the above guidance from the MHCLG and CIPFA, and in order to minimise the risk to investments, the Authority applies minimum acceptable credit criteria in order to generate a list of highly creditworthy counterparties which also enables diversification and thus avoidance of concentration risk. The key ratings used to monitor counterparties are the Short Term and Long Term ratings.
- 4.3. Ratings will not be the sole determinant of the quality of an institution; it is important to continually assess and monitor the financial sector on both a micro and macro basis and in relation to the economic and political environments in which institutions operate. The assessment will also take account of information that reflects the opinion of the markets. To achieve this consideration the Authority will engage with its advisors to maintain a monitor on market pricing such as "credit default swaps" and overlay that information on top of the credit ratings.
- 4.4. Other information sources used will include the financial press, share price and other such information pertaining to the banking sector in order to establish the most robust scrutiny process on the suitability of potential investment counterparties.

### ***Creditworthiness Policy***

- 4.5. This Authority applies the creditworthiness service provided by Link Asset Services. This service employs a sophisticated modelling approach utilising credit ratings from the three main credit rating agencies - Fitch, Moody's and Standard & Poor's.

- 4.6. The credit ratings of counterparties are supplemented with the following overlays:
- credit watches and credit outlooks from credit rating agencies;
  - CDS spreads to give early warning of likely changes in credit ratings;
  - sovereign ratings to select counterparties from only the most creditworthy countries.
- 4.7. This modelling approach combines credit ratings, credit watches, credit outlooks and CDS spreads in a weighted scoring system which is then combined with an overlay of CDS spreads for which the end product is a series of colour code bands which indicate the relative creditworthiness of counterparties. These colour codes are also used by the Authority to determine the duration for investments and are therefore referred to as durational bands. The Authority is satisfied that this service now gives a much improved level of security for its investments. It is also a service which the Authority would not be able to replicate using in house resources.
- 4.8. The Link Asset Services' creditworthiness service uses a wider array of information than just primary ratings. Furthermore, by using a risk weighted scoring system, it does not give undue preponderance to just one agency's ratings.
- 4.9. Typically the minimum credit ratings criteria the Authority use will be a Short Term rating (Fitch or equivalents) of F1 and a Long Term rating of A-. There may be occasions when the counterparty ratings from one rating agency are marginally lower than these ratings but may still be used. In these instances consideration will be given to the whole range of ratings available, or other topical market information, to support their use.
- 4.10. All credit ratings will be monitored weekly. The Authority is alerted to changes to ratings of all three agencies through its use of the Link creditworthiness service. If a downgrade results in the counterparty/investment scheme no longer meeting the Authority's minimum criteria, its further use as a new investment will be withdrawn immediately. In addition to the use of Credit Ratings the Authority will be advised of information in movements in Credit Default Swap against the iTraxx benchmark and other market data on a weekly basis. Extreme market movements may result in downgrade of an institution or removal from the Authority's lending list.
- 4.11. Sole reliance will not be placed on the use of this external service. In addition this Authority will also use market data and market information, information on government support for banks and the credit ratings of that government support.

#### ***Approved Instruments for Investments***

- 4.12. Investments will only be made with those bodies identified by the authority for its use through the Annual Investment Strategy.
- 4.12. **Country Limits** The Authority will apply a sovereign rating at least equal to that of the United Kingdom for any UK based counterparty. At the time of writing this was AA long term and F1+ short term. If there were to be a disorderly Brexit, it is possible that the credit rating agencies could downgrade the sovereign rating for the UK but as we have no minimum sovereign rating applying to the UK this approach will not limit the number of UK counterparties available to the Council. To ensure our credit risk is not increased outside the UK, it is recommended that the sovereign rating requirement for investments is amended to "Non UK countries with a minimum sovereign rating of AA-".

### **Non-specified Investments**

- 4.13. Non specified investments are those which do not meet the Specified Investment Criteria and covers those counterparties where there is either no recognised credit rating and/or an anticipation that an investment will be for greater than one year in duration.
- 4.14. The Authority had not previously placed non-specified investments as a result of its prudent approach to place security and liquidity over yield. However from April 2015 it was agreed that the strategy be amended to include investments with maturity of longer than 364 days. The maximum duration limit on any non-specified deposit will be determined by the colour assigned to the Counterparty on the Link Asset Services credit list on the date the investment is placed, but typically will be for no longer than 24 months. Where such investments are placed via the Secondary Market i.e. buying the remaining term of an existing instrument, then the term will be for 24 months.
- 4.15. A variety of investment instruments will be used, subject to the credit quality of the institution, and depending on the type of investment made it will fall into one of the categories outlined in Table 13 overleaf.
- 4.16. The maturity limits recommended will not be exceeded. Under the delegated powers the Section 151 Officer can set limits that are based on the latest economic conditions and credit ratings.
- 4.17. The following table shows those bodies with which the Authority will invest.

Specified Investments	Non Specified Investments
Deposits with the Debt Management Agency Deposit Facility	
Term Deposits with UK government, UK local authorities, highly credit rated banks and building societies (including callable deposits and forward deals)	Term Deposits with UK government, UK local authorities, highly credit rated banks and building societies (including callable deposits and forward deals) Non-credit rated building societies.  <b><i>The total amount of non-specified investments will not be greater than £5m in value.</i></b>
Banks nationalised/part nationalised or supported by the UK government	Banks nationalised/part nationalised or supported by the UK government
Money Market Funds	
Non UK highly credited rated banks	
UK Government Treasury Bills	
Certificates of Deposit	
Corporate Bonds	
Gilts	

- 4.18. The Authority's detailed risk management policy is outlined in the Treasury Management Policy which is reviewed and considered on an annual basis. The above criteria have been amended since last year to reflect the potential change to UK sovereign ratings.

### **Investment Strategy**

- 4.19. In-house funds: The Authority's in-house managed funds are mainly cash-flow derived and investments will accordingly be made with reference to the core balance and cash flow requirements and the outlook for short-term interest rates.

4.20. Investment returns expectations. Bank Rate is forecast to increase steadily but slowly over the next few years to reach 2.00% by quarter 1 2022. Bank Rate forecasts for financial year ends (March) are:

- 2018/19 0.75%
- 2019/20 1.25%
- 2020/21 1.50%
- 2021/22 2.00%

4.21. The suggested budgeted investment earnings rates for returns on investments placed for periods up to 100 days during each financial year are as follows:

	<b>Now</b>
2018/19	0.75%
2019/20	1.00%
2020/21	1.50%
2021/22	1.75%
2022/23	1.75%
2023/24	2.00%
Later years	2.50%

4.22. The overall balance of risks to these forecasts is currently skewed to the upside and are dependent on how strong GDP growth turns out, how quickly inflation pressures rise and how quickly the Brexit negotiations move forward positively.

4.23. **Investment treasury indicator and limit** - total principal funds invested for greater than 364 days. These limits are set with regard to the Authority's liquidity requirements and to reduce the need for early sale of an investment, and are based on the availability of funds after each year-end.

<b>Maximum principal sums invested &gt; 364 days</b>			
£m	2019-20	2020-21	2021-22
Principal sums invested > 364 days	£5m	£5m	£5m

***End of year investment report***

4.24. At the end of the financial year, the Authority will report on its investment activity as part of its Annual Treasury Report.

***Policy on the use of external service providers***

4.25. The Authority uses Link as its external treasury management advisers. The Authority recognises that responsibility for treasury management decisions remains with the organisation at all times and will ensure that undue reliance is not placed upon our external service providers.

- 4.26. It also recognises that there is value in employing external providers of treasury management services in order to acquire access to specialist skills and resources. The Authority will ensure that the terms of their appointment and the methods by which their value will be assessed are properly agreed and documented, and subjected to regular review.

### ***Treasury Management Scheme of Delegation***

#### ***Full Authority;***

- Receiving and reviewing reports on treasury management policies, practices and activities
- Approval of annual strategy
- Approval of/amendments to the Authority's adopted clauses, treasury management policy statement and treasury management practices
- Budget consideration and approval
- Approval of the division of responsibilities
- Approving the selection of external service providers and agreeing terms of appointment.
- Reviewing the treasury management policy and procedures and making recommendations to the Authority.

#### ***Resources Committee;***

- Receiving and reviewing regular monitoring reports and acting on recommendations
- Review of annual strategy prior to recommendation to full authority

#### ***Role of the Section 151 officer (Director of Finance)***

- Recommending clauses, treasury management policy/practices for approval, reviewing the same regularly, and monitoring compliance
- Submitting regular treasury management policy reports
- Submitting budgets and budget variations
- Receiving and reviewing management information reports
- Reviewing the performance of the treasury management function
- Ensuring the adequacy of treasury management resources and skills, and the effective division of responsibilities within the treasury management function
- Ensuring the adequacy of internal audit and liaising with external audit
- Recommending the appointment of external service providers.

## **5. SUMMARY AND RECOMMENDATIONS**

- 5.1. The Authority is required to consider and approve the treasury management strategy to be adopted prior to the start of the financial year. This strategy must also include proposed prudential indicators and a minimum provision statement (MRP). Approval of the strategy for 2019-20 as contained in this report will also incorporate the adoption of the revised CIPFA Treasury Management Code of Practice.

**AMY WEBB**

**Director of Finance (Treasurer)**